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The Battle of the Nile
by Mich�le Battesti
Centre d'Etudes
d'Histoire de la Defence
August 1st 1999: the French
fleet of Vice-Admiral Bruey, which anchors in Aboukir Bay, is taken by surprise
by the British fleet of Admiral Lord Nelson. A horrific battle at a short
distance takes place. Although the forces are balanced (14 vessels against 13)
the battle becomes a disaster. The result is disastrous for the French: eleven
vessels, among others the flagship Orient and two frigates are destroyed
or captured. 17.000 men with Admiral de Bruey and three other commanding
officers among them die, 1.500 are wounded and 3.000 men are imprisoned by the
British (Nelson set most of them free after a short time because he was not able
to feed them). Only two vessels (Guillaume Tell and the
Gen�n�raux) and two frigates (Diane and Justice) succeed in
getting away from the disaster.
In comparison the English have only lost
two vessels and 218 men, and 678 men are wounded. The immediate consequence for
the French, who have lost their fleet is, that their army of 30.000 men is now
prisoner of the same Egypt, which they recently conquered in the famous battle
of the Pyramids (June, 21st 1798). They are now completely dependent
on the arrival of a support expedition which has to cross the Mediterranean sea,
which is under control of the British. Neither the supporting expedition sent
out by the board of directors (1799) nor the one sent by the consulate (1800 �
1801) has allowed the French to get out of the tight spot. Bonaparte�s strategy
to conquer the Middle East has failed and Great Britain takes over the
leadership of a European coalition against France.
The Battle of the
Nile had a decisive effect on the way history developed because it forced
Bonaparte to give up his plans to conquer the Middle East and to concentrate on
the old Europe. But the most confusing aspect of this is that this battle was
never supposed to take place at all. Following Bonaparte�s original plan, the
French fleet would have been safe in the old port of Alexandria. This was even
more necessary because Nelson was cruising the waters of Egypt and he could come
across the French at any time.
But Bruey refused to enter the harbour
because the sail through was dangerous and he was afraid of finding himself
caught in a trap. Anchoring in Aboukir was a compromise. Bonaparte made a
mistake by being content with it, while Bruey did not feel authorised to leave
the coast of Egypt and he would have refused to leave the army without back up
anyway.
In case of an attack by the British the French were well
equipped: they had the best vessels, a powerful artillery and commandants which
had fought in the battle of America (Bruey, D�cr�s, Blanquet and Chayla). But
strangely enough, several faults and mistakes occurred which had disastrous
consequences: a badly chosen place to anchor, an unfortunate positioning of the
ships, a hesitating command (Villeneuve) and more courage � even a daredevil
attitude - than efficiency. Under these conditions the survival of the fleet was
dependent on the tactical fault of their opponent, something which was not to be
expected from Nelson.
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